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Abstract
This paper explores the roles of internal and external habit formation in a simple
model of endogenous growth with overlapping generations. Unlike the representative
agent settings in which the distinction between internal and external habits may not
yield signiﬁcant qualitative diﬀerences in working of the model economy, we show that
the internal and external habit persistence in overlapping generations economies may
have qualitatively diﬀerent eﬀects on the steady-state characterization as well as on the
dynamic behavior of the economy. We also conﬁrm that in an overlapping generations
framework, whether the habits in the utility function takes subtractive or multiplicative
forms may be critical both for long-run growth and for transitional dynamics.
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When discussing habit persistence of consumption, the literature has distinguished internal
(inward-looking) habits from external (outward-looking) habits. The internal habit formation
means that the current level of utility is aﬀected by the accumulated stock of past private
consumption. Since in this situation the future felicity depends on the choice of current
consumption, a rational consumer takes this fact into account in selecting her optimal con-
sumption plan. In contrast, in the presence of external habit formation, the accumulated
level average past consumption in the economy at large aﬀects the current utility of an in-
dividual consumer. The external habit formation is a form of intertemporal consumption
externalities and thus the consumer does not internalize external habits when making her
optimal decision.
Using the representative agent models, several authors have examined implications of
the distinction between internal and external habit persistence. A sample of this literature
includes Carroll, Overland and Weil (1997, 2000) and Harbaugh (1996) on the relation be-
tween savings and long-run growth, Gomez (2008) on the speed of convergence, Grishchenko
(2007) on asset pricing, and Uribe (2002) on exchange rate determination. Although these
studies demonstrate that whether habit formation is internal or external to the consumers
may yield signiﬁcant quantitative diﬀerences, it may not change working of a model economy
in fundamental ways: the dynamic behavior and steady-state characterization of a model
with internal habit persistence are generally the same as those of a model with external
habit formation. The main reason for this result is that in representative-agent models the
average consumption habit stock of the entire economy equals the private habit stock in
equilibrium. Therefore, the internal habit stock always takes the same level as the external
habit stock. Such a restriction may contribute to reducing qualitative diﬀerences between
outcomes generated by external and internal habit formation.
Unlike most of the foregoing studies, in this paper we examine the eﬀects of internal
and external habits in the context of an overlapping generations (OLG) economy. In an
OLG economy there are heterogeneous cohorts in each period and, hence, the habit stock
of consumers in each cohort is no more equal to the average habit stock of the economy. In
addition, the presence of heterogeneous agents makes intertemporal consumption external-
2ities more complex than those in the representative-agent economies. Those facts suggest
that there may exist signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the roles of internal and external habit
formation in an OLG economy. In order to conﬁrm this prediction, we construct a simple
growth model with overlapping generations where both internal and external consumption
habits are present. As for internal habits, we employ the standard formulation in which the
level of consumption in young age aﬀects the consumer’s felicity when old. In formulating
external habit formation, we follow de la Croix (1996) and de la Croix and Michel (1999) who
assume that young agents’ consumption behavior is aﬀected by their parents’ consumption
levels. Such an ’inherited taste’ represents intergenerational external eﬀects in consumption,
which is a natural expression of external habit formation in an OLG economy.
In this paper we utilize an endogenous growth version of Diamond’s (1965) model and
introduce two types of habits mentioned above into the base model. Inspecting the model
behavior, we obtain two main ﬁndings. First, as was predicted, the steady-state characteri-
zation and dynamic stability of the economy are highly sensitive to whether habit persistence
is internal or external to the agents. In particular, in the presence of external habits per-
sistence, the internal habit formation in consumption may yield more complex eﬀects than
in the representative agent economies. Furthermore, stability of the balanced-growth path
depends heavily upon the strength of habit persistence and the growth eﬀects of internal
habit formation depends on the strength of external habits. Second, the dynamic behavior
and balanced-growth equilibrium are also aﬀected by the way how consumption habit stocks
are introduced into the felicity function. To see this, we use two of the most popular for-
mulations used in the literature: subtractive and multiplicative forms. If habit formation
has a subtractive form in the utility, we generally obtain straightforward conclusions. In
contrast, the formulation of multiplicative habits yields rather complex results and many of
the outcomes depend on whether the agents are conformists or anti-conformists. As well as
the distinction between internal and external habits, in the representative agent economies,
the analytical outcomes of subtractive and multiplicative habit formation yield quantitative
eﬀects alone.1 Our study thus demonstrates that the way how consumption habit formation
1Using models with internal habit persistence, Wendner (2002 and 2003) and Bossi and Gomis-Porqueras
(2009) compare the economic consequences of subtractive and multiplicative forms of consumption habits.
Wendner (2002) uses multiperiod model of consumer’s optimization problem, while Bossi and Gomis-Porqueras
3is formulated plays a more prominent role in an OLG economy than in the representative
agent counterpart.
The present paper is closely related to Carroll et al. (1997 and 2000) and Alonso-Carrera
et al. (2007). Carroll et al. (1997 and 2000) examine representative agent models of en-
dogenous growth with an Ak technology. They compare the model with internal habits with
one with external habits. As mentioned above, they conclude that while the distinction be-
tween internal and external habit formation may produce relevant quantitative diﬀerences,
the equilibrium dynamics and steady state of the model economy are not aﬀected by that
distinction. Our discussion clariﬁes that their ﬁndings do not necessarily hold in overlap-
ping generations settings. Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007) construct an overlapping generations
model with internal as well as external habit formation. They use an exogenous (neoclas-
sical) growth model and assume the presence of bequest motives. Their central concern is
to analyze the eﬀects of habit formation on integenerational wealth transmission.2 Although
the basic model structure of this paper is similar to those examined by Carroll et al. (1997
and 2000) and Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007), our research concern does not overlap these
existing studies. Therefore, the present paper is a compliment rather than a substitute to
the foregoing contributions.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up the analytical
framework. Section 3 examines a model with subtractive habit formation, while Section 4
reconsiders the base model in the case of multiplicative habits. In both sections, we focus on
the properties of balanced-growth equilibrium and equilibrium dynamics out of the balanced-
growth path. Section 5 presents some numerical examples and Section 6 concludes.
(2009) uses an exchange economy model with overlapping generations.
2Alonso-Carrera et al. (2008) introduce intragenerational wealth heterogeneity into a small country version
of their base model and examine the eﬀect of habit formation on the stationary wealth distribution.
3As for introducing consumption habit persistence into OLG models, Lahiri and Puhakka (1998) is probably
the ﬁrst study that examines the role of internal consumption habits in an OLG economy. They introduce
internal habit formation into the Gale-Samuelson type model of an exchange economy. Bossi and Gomis-
Porqueras (2009) extend the discussion of Lahiri and Puhakka (1998). In addition, Bunzel (2006) considers
the monetary OLG model with internal habit persistence.
42 Analytical Framework
2.1 Preferences
Consider an overlapping generations economy where there are three types of agents, young,
adult and old. When young, the agents neither consume nor work. They only observe
their parents’ (i.e. adult agents’) consumption behavior and ’inherit’ their tastes. During
adult period, the agents work, consume and save. At the same time, they again observe
consumption behaviors of their parents (i.e. old agents) and inherit them.4 When old, the
agents only consume. Population is constant and each cohort consists of a continuum of
identical agents with a unit mass. In the following, the t-th generation means the cohort
born at the beginning of period t − 1.
The life-time utility function of an agent in the t-th generation is given by
Ut = u(ct,h t)+βu(xt+1,h t+1), 0 < β < 1, (1)
where ct denotes consumption when adult, xt+1 is consumption when old, and β is a given
discount factor. Here, ht and ht+1 represent stocks of consumption habits in period t and
t +1 , respectively. For analytical clarity, the following discussion employs speciﬁc forms of
utility functions. More speciﬁcally, we consider alternative forms of popular speciﬁcations:
subtractive habits and multiplicative habits. When assuming the preference structure with









, θ0, θ1, σ > 0. (2)
Ever since Ryder and Heal (1973), this form of utility function including habit persistence
has been frequently employed in the literature. Similarly, the felicity function involving















, 0 < θ0, θ1 < 1, σ > 1. (3)
4The assumption of taste inheritance in the adult age follows de la Croix (1996) and de la Croix and Michel
(1999). In this paper we also assume that the old agents inherit consumption behavior of their parents when
they are old.
5We compare the eﬀects of internal and external habit formations by use of alternative func-
tional forms given by (2) and (3).5
In general, ht depends ct−1 alone and ht+1 is determined by ct and xt. Since we have
assumed that young agents do not consume, the stock of consumption habits held by the
adult agents does not involve their past consumption. Thus the habit stock held by the adult
agent is inherited from their parents’ consumption in period t − 1:
ht = ct−1. (4)
We assume that the habit stock held when old, ht+1, increases with ct and xt :
ht+1 = h(ct,x t). (5)
Namely, the habit stock held in the old period consists of the old-age consumption of their
parents as well as their own consumption in the previous period.6 In what follows, when we




ct, η > 0. (6)





t , 0 ≤ ε1, ε2 ≤ 1. (7)
It is to be noted that, as we will see in Footnote 11 in Section 4, if σ is less than one, then
the felicity function with (7) cannot yield an interior solution for the household’s selection of
optimal consumption. To avoid obtaining this result, we use a linear function similar to (6)
when we consider the case of multiplicative habits when 0 < σ < 1.(See Section 4.3.)
To sum up, external habits are expressed by ct−1 in (4) and xt in (5), which also represent
intertemporal consumption externalities. In contrast, ct in (5) means the internal habit
5In the recent literature, Alonso-Carrera et al. (2005), Alverz-Cuadrado et al. (2007), Bunzel (2006) and
Carroll et al. (1997, 2000) use the multiplicative forms of habit persistence, whereas de la Croix (1996, 2001),
Lahiri and Puhakka (1998), Wendner (2002, 2003) employ the subtractive form of habit formation.
6More generally, we may assume that ht+1 also depends on the average consumption in the economy at large
when agents are young, that is, ht+1 = h(ct,¯ ct,x t), where ¯ ct denotes the average consumption when young. In
this formulation, ¯ ct expresses the intertemporal as well as intragenerational consumption externalities. Since
introduction of ¯ ct eﬀect adds a purely quantitative eﬀects on the model behavior, the following discussion does
not consider ¯ ct.
6f o r m a t i o np e r c e i v e db yt h ea d u l ta g e n t sw h e nd eciding their optimal consumption-saving
plan.7
2.2 Consumption and Saving
An adult agent supplies one unit of labor inelastically and spends its wage income for con-
sumption and saving. In the old age, the agent consumes all of her savings. Thus the ﬂow
budget constraints for adult and old agents are respectively given by
ct + st = wt, (8)
xt+1 = Rt+1st, (9)
where wt, st and Rt+1 denote real wage in period t, saving of the adult and the gross rate of
return to capital in period t +1 , respectively. Combining these ﬂow constraints, we obtain





In the beginning of period t, an agent in cohort born in period t − 1 maximizes Ut given
by (1) subject to (10), (4) and (5). Considering that ct−1 and xt are external to the t-th







7In this paper we focus on intertemporal consumption externalities from parents to children. If we consider
intratemporal external eﬀects as well, the utility function may be set as
Ut = u(ct,h t,e t)+βu(xt+1,h t,e t+1)
where et and et+1 represent intratemporal consumption external eﬀects determined by
et = e(¯ ct, ¯ xt),e t+1 = e(¯ xt+1,¯ ct+1).
Here, a variable with an upper bar means the average level of that variable. This formulation states that
the felicity of an agent is also aﬀected by the current level of average consumption in the economy at large.
Note that in this formulation the felicity of an old agent depends on the average consumption of the next
generation, ¯ ct+1, which may change the dynamic properties of the model economy: see Mino (2007 and 2008)
for dynamic analyses of OLG models with intratemporal consumption externalities.
7In the presence of internal habit formation, a substitution between consumption when adult,
ct, and consumption when old, xt+1, has two eﬀects. One is the direct intertemporal sub-
stitution between current and future consumption, which is represented by the ﬁrst term in
the left-hand side of (11). Additionally, a change in the current consumption, ct, alters the
level of habit stock in the old age, which aﬀects the felicity when old. The second term in the
left-hand side of (11) expresses such an indirect substitution eﬀect caused by the presence of
inward-looking consumption habits. The optimal choice between ct and xt+1 thus requires
that the sum of the direct and indirect rates of substitution equals the discounted rate of










As formulated in (2) and (3), the standard formulation of internal habits assumes that
u2 (x,h) < 0. One unit decrease in the current consumption, ct, increases one unit of saving,
which yields the real interest, Rt+1, plus the return to a reduction in the internal consumption
habit stock held in the next period represented by −[u2 (.)(∂ht+1/∂ct)]/u1 (.)(> 0). Thus
(12) states that the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution in consumption equals the
discounted subjective rate of return to investment that includes a change in the stock of
internal consumption habits.
Finally, since only young agents work, capital accumulation is determined by the following
condition:
kt+1 = st = wt − ct. (13)
2.3 Production
To avoid unnecessary complexity, we use one of the simplest models of endogenous growth.




¢1−α ,A > 0, α < 1,
where yt is aggregate output, kt is capital and Nt denotes the total labor supply. In addition,
¯ kt expresses production externalities generated by capital stock in the sense of Romer (1986).
Because of normalization of the number of young agents, we set Nt =1for all t. In addition
8¯ kt = kt in equilibrium. Therefore, the social production function that internalizes production
externalities is written as
yt = Akt. (14)
If capital depreciates at the rate of δ ∈ [0,1], the gross rate of return, Rt, equals 1+
∂Yt/∂kt −δ. We assume that capital completely depreciates within a period (δ =1 ), so that
Rt is given by
Rt = αA, (15)
implying that the gross rate of return to capital stays constant over time.8 Similarly, the real
wage rate equals the private marginal productivity of labor, and hence
wt =( 1− α)yt/Nt =( 1− α)Akt. (16)
Because of an Ak structure of production, the economy can sustain persistent growth.9
3 Subtractive Habits
We ﬁrst consider the model with a subtractive form of habit formation. Substituting (4) and






(xt+1 − θ1xt − ηct)
1−σ
1 − σ
, θ0, θ1, η > 0. (17)
8Since one period may be 25 or 30 years in a two-period lived OLG economy, the assumption of complete
depreciation of capital would be plausible.







where ht denotes stock of human capital. Suppose that both types of capital stocks are produced by use
of ﬁnal goods. Then the non-arbitrage condition between holding physical and human capital is given by
∂yt/∂kt = ∂yt/∂ht, which yields αyt/kt =( 1 − α)yt/ht so that ht =
1−α
α kt. Substituting this into the







Since this formulation does not assume the presence of external increasing returns, unlike the Romer-type
modelling, there is no intratemporal ineﬃciency in production. Otherwise, both formulations give essentially
the same results. See, for example, Chapter 8 in Acemoglu (2009) for the detailed discussion on the Ak growth
model with two capital stocks.
9Here, θ0 and θ1 represent the strength of taste inheritance, while η expresses the degree of
internal habit persistence in the old age.10
3.1 Dynamic System
Given (17), the optimal condition (11) is expressed as
(ct − θ0ct−1)−σ = β(Rt+1 + η)(xt+1 − θ1xt − ηct)−σ. (18)
Using (9) and (13), we obtain xt+1 = Rt+1kt+1. Thus from (15), it holds that
xt+1 = αAkt+1. (19)
In view of (15) and (19), the optimization condition (18) can be written as
αAkt+1 − (η + φ)ct + φθ0ct−1 − θ1αAkt =0 , (20)
where
φ ≡ [β(η + αA)]
1
σ.
In addition, equations (13) and (16) yield:













B yu s eo ft h ea b o v ee q u a t i o n ,w eﬁnd that (20) gives the following diﬀerence equation of zt:
zt =
φθ0(1 + zt+1)
A[(η + φ)(1 − α)+θ1α − α(A(1 − α) − θ1)zt+1]
. (23)
Since this equation contains all the equilibrium and optimization conditions, it gives a com-
plete dynamic system of our economy.
10As mentioned in Section 1, Alonso-Carrera et al. (2007) study an overlapping generations economy model
with internal as well as external habit formation. In our notation, their utility function is
Ut = αlog(ct − θct−1)+β log(xt+1 − ηct)+γ logbt,
where bt denotes bequests. Unlike our formulation, the above setting ignores the taste inheritance in the old
age.
103.2 Balanced-Growth Equilibrium
In the steady-state equilibrium, xt,c t and kt grow at a common rate. As a result, zt (= kt/ct−1)














ξ ≡ A[(η + φ)(1 − α)+θ1α] − φθ0,
κ ≡ αA[A(1 − α) − θ1],
φ ≡ [β(αA + η)]
1
σ.
To ensure the existence of z∗, we assume that
ξ2 − 4κφθ0 > 0. (25)
Inspecting (23) and the steady-state condition shown above, we may summarize the
steady-state characterization in the case of subtractive form of habit formation in the follow-
ing manner:
Proposition 1 In the model with a subtractive form of habit formation, (i) if A(1−α) > θ1,
then there exist dual balanced-growth paths: one with a higher growth rate is locally stable
and the other with a lower growth rate is locally unstable, and; (ii) if A(1−α) < θ1, then the
b a l a n c e d - g r o w t hp a t hi su n i q u e l yg i v e na n di ti sg l o b a l l yu n s t a b l e .
Proof. Let us write (23) as
zt = G(zt+1),
where G(zt+1) is the right-hand side of (23). Note that
G0 (zt+1)=
φθ0(η + φ + αA)(1 − α)





A[(η + φ)(1 − α)+θ1α]
> 0.
11In addition, it is easy to see that if A(1−α) > θ1, then G00 (zt+1) > 0 and limzt+1→¯ z G(zt+1)=
+∞, where
¯ z =
(η + φ)(1 − α)+θ1α
α[A(1 − α) − θ1]
.
Hence, G(zt+1) is monotonically increasing and strictly convex in zt+1 so that there are two
values of z∗ satisfying z∗ = G(z∗). Since G(zt+1) is a monotonic function, the dynamic
equation can be expressed as
zt+1 = G−1 (zt).









is strictly larger (resp. smaller) than 1, when z∗ has a relatively small (resp. large) value.
Since the initial value of zt = kt/ct−1 is historically given in the beginning of period t, the
above shows that the steady state with a higher z∗ is locally stable, while the steady state
with a lower z∗ is locally unstable. In the case that A(1 − α) < θ1, it is satisﬁed that
G00 (zt+1) < 0 so that G(zt+1) is strictly concave, implying that the steady state with a




zt=z∗ =1 /G0 (z∗) < 1 holds in this case, the unique
b a l a n c e d - g r o w t hp a t hi sg l o b a l l yu n s t a ble: see Figure 2. Finally, notice that (14) and (21)
give yt+1/yt = kt+1/kt =( 1−α)A−ct/kt. Therefore, the gross growth rate of income on the




This equation shows that the balanced-growth rate, g∗, increases with the steady-state level
of z∗. Hence, the balanced-growth path with a higher value of z∗ sustains higher growth of
income and capital.
In what follows, we focus on the stable balanced-growth path obtained under the condi-
tion of A(1 − α) > θ1. More speciﬁcally, we examine how the strength of consumption habits
aﬀects the long-term growth rate of the economy. Since the balanced-growth rate of income
monotonically increases with the steady-state value of zt, we may consider the relation be-
tween external and internal habit formation and long-term growth by exploring the eﬀects of
12changes in parameters, θ0, θ1 and η on z∗. Remember that when A(1 − α) > θ1, the steady







where κ = αA[A(1 − α) − θ1] > 0. In view of deﬁnitions of ξ, κ and φ given in (24), it is







Since the balanced-growth rate is positively related to z∗, the above results show that a higher
degree of taste inheritance in the adult age decelerates growth, while a stronger degree of
aspiration for their parents’ consumption in the old age accelerates capital formation. Note
that a higher aspiration for parents’ consumption in adult age raises the marginal utility in
that period, so that the adult agents increase their consumption level relative to that in their
old age. As a result, savings are reduced and thus capital accumulation is decelerated. In
contrast, a rise in the degree of external eﬀect in old age increases the marginal utility of
consumption when old. Thus the agents substitute consumption in their adult age with that
in their old age and, therefore, savings will increase to yield a higher balanced-growth rate of
income.
The eﬀects of a change in the intensity of internal habit formation, η, are more complex
than those of θ0 and θ1. Since both ξ and φ increase with η, the eﬀect of a change on z∗ is
ambiguous if A(1 − α)−θ1 > 0. If there is no taste inheritance in the adult age (i.e. θ0 =0 ) ,
then z∗ monotonically increases with η. In fact, when θ0 =0 , the steady-state levels of z are













α[A(1 − α) − θ1]
, (28)
which is an increasing function of η. Hence, the possible presence of a negative relation
between z∗ (so the balanced-growth rate) and the degree of internal habit persistence is
attributed to the presence of external habit formation in the adult period.
In sum, we have shown:
Proposition 2 On the balanced-growth path satisfying local stability, a higher degree of sub-
tractive habit persistence in the adult age lowers the balanced-growth rate, while a stronger
13external habit persistence when old enhances long-term growth. A rise in the intensity of
internal habit persistence increases the balanced-growth rate if there is no taste inheritance
in the adult age. Otherwise, the growth eﬀect of internal habit persistence depends on the
parameter values involved in the model.
We may obtain more precise interpretation of the comparative statics results in the above
proposition. To do so, let us write (11) as
ˆ xt+1
ˆ ct
=[ β(αA + η)]
1
σ, (29)
where ˆ ct = ct−θ0ct−1 and ˆ xt+1 = xt+1−θ1xt−ηct. This equation states that the optimal choice
between the habit-adjusted consumption in adult and old ages depends upon the discounted
rate of return to capital plus the degree of internal habit persistence. Note that changes
in the strength of external habits, θ0 and θ1, do not alter the ratio of the habit-adjusted
consumption in adult and old ages. Hence, if θ0 increases under given levels of ct−1 and xt,
both ct and xt+1 increase to keep ˆ xt+1/ˆ ct constant. As a result, consumption in both adult
and old age rise, so that capital accumulation will decline. When θ1 becomes higher under
a given level of xt, consumption in the adult age, ct will decline to keep ˆ xt+1/ˆ ct constant,
implying that savings of adult agents increase and capital accumulation is accelerated.
As for the eﬀects of a change in the degree of internal habit persistence, η, it is to be




xt+1 − θ1xt − ηct
ct
=[ β(αA + η)]
1
σ
In this case, a rise in η increases the habit-adjusted discounted rate of return, β (αA + η),
and the habit adjusted-consumption during the old age, ˆ xt+1, under a given level of ct. To
keep the above condition, ct must decline so that capital accumulation will be enhanced. In









αAz∗ − η =[ β(αA + η)]
1
σ.
In deriving the above, we use xt+1/xt = g∗ and xt+1/ct = αAkt+1/ct = αAz∗. Remember
that from (26) g∗ is positively related to z∗. Thus a rise in the habit-adjusted rate of return
β (αA + η) is associated with a higher rate of balanced-growth.




xt+1 − θ1xt − ηct
ct − θ0ct−1
=[ β(αA + η)]
1
σ.













=[ β(αA + η)]
1
σ,
This equation indicates that both g∗ and z∗ could decrease, when a rise in η increases the
rate of marginal substitution between the habit-adjusted consumption ˆ ct and ˆ xt.
If there are internal habits alone (θ0 = θ1 =0 ), then dynamic equation (20) is replaced







where gt = kt+1/kt. Thus, using (21) and (28), we see that if θ0 = θ1 =0 , the gross growth












In this case, the predetermined variable at the beginning of period t is kt alone, the initial
value of gt (= kt+1/kt) is not ﬁxed. Therefore, the economy without external habits always
stays on the balanced-growth path. As (30) shows, a rise η increases gt, which means that
a stronger internal habit persistence produces a higher income growth if there is no external
habit formation.
Consequently, we have found:
Proposition 3 In the case of subtractive habit formation, there exists a unique and stable
balanced-growth path if there is external habit persistence alone. If there is only internal habit
formation, then the economy always stays on a unique balanced-growth path and a stronger
habit persistence increases the balanced-growth rate of the economy.
4 Multiplicative Habits
In this section we assume that habit stocks are involved in the felicity function as multiplica-
















, σ > 1, 0 < γ < θ < 1. (31)
15In the above, θ and γ −θ respectively denote the degrees of external habits in adult and old
ages, while γ represents the intensity of internal habit formation in the old age. Since we will
focus on the balanced-growth equilibrium in which ct and xt grow at a common, constant
r a t e ,t h ef e l i c i t yi ne a c hp e r i o ds h o u l dh a v et h esame degree of homogeneity. To satisfy this




t , is homogeneous of
degree −θ in ct and xt to keep the homogeneity of Ut function. In addition, we assume that
σ > 1 in order to obtain an interior solution for the household’s optimization problem.11
When we consider the case of 0 < σ < 1 in Section 4.3, we will use an alternative functional
form.
4.1 Dynamic System
The representative agent in cohort born in period t − 1 chooses ct,and xt+1 to maximize the






































σ [(1 − α)A]γ(1−σ).
Dynamic equation (33) presents a complete dynamic system that summarizes the equilibrium
dynamics of the model with the multiplicative form of habit formation.
















Under given levels of ct−1 and xt, the above expression means that limst→wt Ut =+ ∞, if 0 < σ < 1. Therefore,
when σ is less than one, the optimal choice of ct is a corner solution: ct =0 . See Alonso-Carrera et al. (2005)
and Hiraguchi (2008) for the detail.
164.2 Balanced-Growth Equilibrium
Inspecting dynamic equation (33), we ﬁrst ﬁnd the following result:
Proposition 4 If the utility function is given by (31) in the case of multiplicative habits,
then there is a unique balanced-growth equilibrium that satisﬁes global stability.
Proof. Let us rewrite (33) as
zt =
"




















t+1 ≡ F (zt+1). (34)
The steady-state value of zt fulﬁlling z∗ = F (z∗) is given by
(z∗)θ−1







Considering our assumptions that 0 < θ < 1 and γ > 0, we see that the left-hand side of
(35) monotonically decreases with z∗ and it takes +∞ when z∗ =0 , while it is zero when
z∗ =+ ∞. Similarly, the right-hand side of (35) is strictly increasing in z∗ and it is zero when
z∗ =0 . Therefore, there is a unique, positive value of z that fulﬁlls (35). To check stability






































which demonstrates that the unique interior steady state is globally stable.
We also conﬁrm that in the case of σ > 1, if θ increases, the steady-state value of z∗
satisfying (35) decreases. Additionally, it is also seen that the eﬀect of a change in γ on z∗ is
ambiguous. In Section 6 we numerically examine the growth eﬀect of a change in η.
We summarize these comparative statics results as follows:
17Proposition 5 If the utility function is given by (31), a higher degree of external habit for-
mation depresses long-run growth, while the growth eﬀect of a rise in the strength of internal
habit persistence depends on the parameter values involved in the model economy.
It is to be noted that unlike the subtractive form of habit persistence discussed in the
previous section, we have imposed restrictions on the parameter speciﬁcation to sustain the
balanced-growth equilibrium. Therefore, a rise in θ increases the habit persistence eﬀect of
consumption in the adult age but it decreases the degree of habit persistence in the old age:
see the utility function (31). This means that a rise in γ stimulates consumption when the
agents are adult so that capital accumulation is lowered. In contrast, a change in γ aﬀects
the degrees of strength of internal and external habit persistence in the old age at the same
time. In section 4.3 we use an alternative functional form of utility function that can treat
those eﬀects separately.
In order to emphasize the diﬀerence between the subtractive and multiplicative forms of

















where ˆ ct = ctc−θ




t respectively denote the habit-adjusted consump-
tion in the adult and old ages. A key diﬀerence between (29) and (36) is that in the case of
multiplicative habits, the marginal rate of substitution between habit-adjusted consumption
in the adult and old ages is not constant over time. Furthermore, the level of relative habit
stocks, ht/ht+1, also aﬀects the optimal selection between ˆ ct and ˆ xt+1. The qualitative as well
as quantitative divergence in outcomes between the subtractive and multiplicative formations
of consumption habits mainly come from these diﬀerences in the ﬁrst-order condition.
Two special cases deserve to be mentioned. First, suppose that there is no external habit
formation in the adult age (θ =0 ). Then (34) becomes




This system contains only zt+1 = kt+1/ct. Since the value of ct is not speciﬁed at the beginning
of t, the economy, again, always stays on the balanced-growth path. In view of the deﬁnition
18of Ω, we ﬁnd that the steady-state level of z is determined by
1
z∗(z∗ +1 ) γ =
"
(αA)





It is easy to see that, given our assumption that σ > 1, ar i s ei nγ raises z∗ satisfying the
above equation. Therefore, as well as in the case of subtractive habits, a larger internal habit
persistence enhances long-term growth if there is no external habit formation.
Next, assume that there is no internal habit formation, so that γ =0 . In this case we
can consider the case of 0 < σ < 1, because the household’s optimization problem involves
an interior solution for all σ > 0 if there is no internal habit persistence. When γ =0 , the

















t+1 ≡ N (zt+1). (38)
Inspecting (38),w eﬁnd the following. When σ > 1, it is easy to see that function N (zt+1)
deﬁned in (38) is monotonically increasing and strictly convex function of zt: see Figure 3-a.
Therefore, the unique balanced-growth equilibrium satisﬁes global stability. An increase in
the degree of external eﬀect, θ, shifts down the graph of N (zt+1), so that the steady-state
value of zt increases. Since there is positive relation between the steady-state levels of zt and
the balanced-growth rate of income, a higher θ raises the balanced-growth rate. In contrast,
if σ < 1, as depicted by Figure 3-b, the graph of N (zt+1) is monotonically decreasing with
N (0) = +∞ and N (+∞)=0 . Thus the steady state is uniquely determined. However, a
rise in θ produces a downward shift of the graph of N (zt+1) and thus the steady-state level of
z decreases, implying that a higher degree of external habit persistence depresses long-term
growth if the intertemporal elasticity of felicity is higher than one.






























19Consequently, the dynamics system exhibits local stability around the balanced-growth equi-









Otherwise, the dynamic system is locally unstable. As shown above, the balanced-growth
path is uniquely determined, the economy satisﬁes global stability if (39) is met. As a result,
if θ/(1 + θ) < σ < 1, then the economy cyclically converges to the balanced-growth path.
We may summarize the above argument as the following proposition:
Proposition 6 If consumption habit formation takes a multiplicative form and if there is no
internal habit persistence, then the balanced-growth path is uniquely given and it is globally




In addition, σ > 1, a higher degree of external habit formation, θ, raises the balanced-growth
rate, while it lowers the balanced-growth rate if θ/(1 + θ) < σ < 1.







= sign θ(σ − 1).
Thus if σ > 1, the marginal utility of private consumption increases with her parent’s con-
sumption levels, that is, the agents are conformists in the sense that they like being similar to
their parents consumption behaviors (keeping up with their parents). In contrast, if σ < 1,
then the marginal utility of private consumption decreases with ct−1 and xt so that the agents
are anti-conformist (running away from their parents). The former case promotes consump-
tion (and capital) growth on the balanced-growth path, but in the latter case, the presence
of external habits depresses long-term growth. These results are similar to the comparative
statics results on the balanced-growth path of a representative agent economy with external
consumption habits and an Ak technology: see Carroll et al. (1997 and 2000).
4.3 An Alternative Speciﬁcation
So far, we have assumed that if there is internal habit persistence, the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution in felicity, 1/σ, should be less than unity to yield an interior solution for














, σ > 0, σ 6=1 , 0 < θ < 1, (40)
where
ht+1 = εxt + ηct, ε > 0, η > 0.
It is easy to see that as long as ε > 0, this function may yield an interior optimum solution
for the household’s consumption plan even for the case that 0 < σ < 1.





































αε(1 + zt+1)+η(1 − α)
.













αεA(1 + zt+1)+η(1 − α)A
¸
≡ H (zt+1). (42)
The steady-state level of zt satisﬁes z = H (z). Since H (.) function is rather complex, it
is more convenient to express the steady-state condition, z = H (z), for the case of σ > 1 in
the following manner:




















21When σ > 1, we see that I (0) = +∞ and I (+∞)=0as well as
















Furthermore, both I (z) and J (z) monotonically decreases with z. As a consequence, the
relation between these two functions are depicted in Figures 4-a which shows that there is at
least one steady-state value of z. It is also seen that a rise in the degree of internal habits, γ
shifts the graphs of I (z) up and that of J (z) down. Therefore, a higher degree of internal
habits raises the steady-state value of z and, hence, the balanced-growth rate will increase as
long as the balanced-growth path is stable.












































Again, as Figure 4-b demonstrates, there is at least one steady-state level of z. Since in this
case a rise in γ m a ys h i f t sd o w no ru pt h eg r a p ho fL(z), its eﬀect on the long-term growth
depends on the parameter values.
This example indicates that in the presence of both internal and external habit persis-
tence, not only the growth eﬀect of outward-looking habit formation but also the growth
eﬀect of inward-looking habits may critically depend on whether the agents are conformists
(θ(1 − σ) < 0) or anti-conformists (θ(1 − σ) > 1).
5 Numerical Examples
In this section we examine some numerical examples of the basic models. All the examples
shown below set the following baseline parameter values:
α =0 .3, β =0 .5,A =5 .0
22Following the standard speciﬁcation, the income share of capital, α, is assumed to be 0.3.
Since in our three-period lived OLG model, one period may be considered 25 years, so that






. The magnitude of the total factor productivity, A, is set at 5.0 to make
the balanced-growth rates plausible ones.12
5.1 Subtractive Habits
First, consider the model with the subtractive form of habit formation. As shown in Propo-
sition 1, the balanced-growth path is unstable if A(1 − α) < θ1. Therefore, we focus on the
stable balanced-equilibrium for the case of A(1 − α) > θ1.
Case (i): A change in θ0
When we consider the growth eﬀect of a change in the strength of taste inheritance in the
adult age, we assume:
θ1 =0 .8, η =0 .6, σ =2 .0
Then we specify the magnitude of θ0 and calibrate the steady-state value of z∗ given in (27).
Substitute these values into (26), we obtain the following rates of balanced-growth:
g∗ =3 .00213 for θ0 =0 .5,
g∗ =2 .98875 for θ0 =0 .6,
g∗ =2 .97412 for θ0 =0 .7.
Note that we have assumed that one period is about 25 years, the annual growth rates of
income are respectively given by 0.04495 (for θ0 =0 .5), 0.04476 (for θ0 =0 .6), and 0.04456
(for θ0 =0 .7). As shown in Proposition 1, a higher degree of taste inheritance in the old age
depresses the balanced-growth rate.
If we replace σ =2 .0 with σ =0 .8, then the balanced-growth rate respectively becomes
g∗ =3 .00967 for θ0 =0 .5,
g∗ =2 .99627 for θ0 =0 .6,
g∗ =2 .98165 for θ0 =0 .7.
12It is to be noted that the gross rate of return to capital is R = αA =1 .5 in this example. Thus the annual
net rate of return is r =( 1 .5)
1/25 − 1=0 .01635.
23A higher intetemporal elasticity of substitution in felicity yields a higher balanced-growth
rate. The growth eﬀect of a change in θ0 is almost the same as that obtained when σ =0 .2.
Case (ii): A change in θ1
As well as in case (i), we conduct calculation of the balanced-growth rate for alternative
values of θ1 and σ. In this example, we set θ0 =0 .5. The results are summarized in the table
below.
σ =0 .2 σ =0 .8
θ1 =0 .5 2.96158 2.97070
θ1 =0 .6 2.99629 2.98499
θ1 =0 .7 2,98953 2.99745
These ﬁgures indicate that a larger impact of taste inheritance in the old age promotes long-
term growth of income.
Case (iii) A change in η
We have seen that when there are external habit persistence, the growth eﬀect of a change
in the degree of internal habit persistence, η, is analytically ambiguous. If we assume that
θ0 =0 .5 and θ1 =0 .8, then the balanced-growth rates are given by the following table:
σ =0 .2 σ =0 .8
η =0 .5 2.96870 2.97896
η =0 .6 3.00313 3.00967
η =0 .7 3.10057 3.12544
Hence, in this example, a rise in the degree of internal habit persistence accelerates growth
in the long-run equilibrium.
5.2 Multiplicative Habits
In the case of multiplicative form of habit formation, we still assume that α =0 .3, β =0 .5
and A =5 .0. We use (35) to calculate z∗ and derive the balanced-growth rate g∗ by use of
(26). The following examples ﬁxt h el e v e lo fσ at 1.2.
Since the model with multiplicative form of habits contains two parameters concerning
the degree of internal and external habit persistence, we calculate the balanced-growth rate,
24g∗, for alternative magnitudes of θ and γ
θ =0 .2 θ =0 .5
γ =0 .2 1.2841 1.2621
γ =0 .3 1.3371 1.3126
γ =0 .4 1.3936 1.3706
γ =0 .5 1.4518 1.4320
In this table θ takes two values, 0.2 and 0.5, while we change γ from 0.2 to 0.5. As Proposition
5 states, a higher degree of external habit persistence (a higher value of θ) depresses the long-
run growth rate of income under a given level of γ. Although analytical inspection cannot
specify whether or not a rise in the degree of internal habit, γ, enhances long-run growth,
our example gives a positive relation between γ and g∗ under a given level of θ.
Comparing with the case of subtractive habits, we see that the balanced-growth rate
of the model with multiplicative habits is relatively low. For example, when θ =0 .2, the
net annual growth rates of income are: 0.01005 (for γ =0 .2), 0.0137 (for γ =0 .3), 0.01451
(for γ =0 .4) and 0.0150 (for γ =0 .5). This result simply comes from the model speciﬁcation
and we may obtain higher balanced-growth rates by setting A =7 .0 or 8.0.
Finally, consider the special cases. If there is no internal habit formation (γ =0 ), then the
steady-state value of z is given by (37). Using this relation to calculate the balanced-growth
rate, we ﬁnd the following:
σ =1 .2 σ =0 .8
θ =0 .2 1.1867 1.1392
θ =0 .3 1.1776 1.1523
θ =0 .4 1.1681 1.1648
θ =0 .5 1.1583 1.1769
Hence, we see that a rise in the strength of external habit persistence lowers growth if σ > 1,
but it raises the long-run growth rate if 0 < σ < 1.
Next, consider the case where there is no habit inheritance in the adult age, i.e. θ =0
(but there are external habits in the old age). Since we should assume that σ > 1. we obtain
25the following balanced-growth rates under σ =1 .2:
g∗ =1 .3002 for γ =0 .2
g∗ =1 .3521 for γ =0 .3,
g∗ =1 .4066 for γ =0 .4,
g∗ =1 .4638 for γ =0 .5.
In this example, both internal and external habit persistences in the old age increase. As
shown above, a higher degree of habits persistence in the old age enhances growth.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has examined how the presence of internal as well as external habit formation
aﬀects long-run equilibrium and dynamic behavior of an overlapping generations economy
with endogenous growth. We have shown that if there is only external habit formation,
which represents taste inheritance from parents to children, then it plays the role similar to
that in the representative agent economies. Namely, in the presence of envy (aspiration) and
conformism, external habit formation may promote long-run growth, while anti-conformism
would reduce the long-term growth rate of income. In contrast, internal habit formation in
an overlapping generations model with endogenous growth presents more complex eﬀects on
the dynamic behavior as well as the steady-state characteristic of the economy. Therefore,
when the consumers have both types habits persistence, the distinction between external
and internal habit persistence would be more relevant in OLG economies than in the rep-
resentative agent counterpart where both types of habits generally yield the same type of
impact on the economy. Additionally, we have conﬁrmed that the dynamic behavior and
steady-state conditions of an OLG economy is highly sensitive to whether habit stocks are
introduced into the felicity function in subtractive or multiplicative form. Since functional
forms of habit formation generally yields quantitative eﬀects alone in the representative-agent
models, our ﬁndings have demonstrated that the how the preference structure is formulated
would be critical in examining overlapping generations economies with habit persistence in
consumption.
In this paper we have focused on the issue how the alternative formulations of habit
26persistence of consumption may yield diﬀerent outcomes in an endogenously growing economy.
Our next task is to investigate policy implications in growing OLG economies in the presence
of alternative forms of habit formation.
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